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ABSTRACT 
The major risk associated with the provision of toll facilities results from uncertain future 
demand/revenue generated from the facilities. In this paper, I examine various options for 
mitigating toll revenue risk and provide a set of recommendations as to how revenue risk 
mitigation should be pursued. In addition to conducting more careful traffic revenue studies and 
risk analyses, policy makers can provide more flexible tolling schedules, adopt advanced toll 
collection technology, and limit the non-compete clause included in many toll road deals with 
private operators.    
Keywords – Risk mitigation; revenue risk; pricing method; toll collection technology; non-
compete clause.   
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INTRODUCTION  
Before committing to large and costly transport projects, both the public sector and the private 
sector must develop a better understanding of the potential risks associated with alternative 
options. Revenues associated with toll road projects can be very risky due to high initial 
investment costs and construction risks, high operating and maintenance costs, and lengthy 
service periods.  
Road infrastructure project risks can be classified into two broad categories: common 
risks and project-specific risks (Checherita and Gifford, 2007). Major common risks include 
those associated with (1) design failure; (2) cost and time overruns; (3) construction risks (most 
important for new facilities, including unexpected geological challenges, and construction 
hazards); (4) changes in the cost of repair and renovation; (5) force majeure risks (i.e., risks 
associated with exogenous events such as earthquakes, wars, floods, and tidal waves); (6) 
macroeconomic risks (i.e., population growth, inflation rate, exchange rate, interest rate, etc.); (7) 
risks from requirements for environmental permits related to facility construction or expansion; 
(8) legal and institutional risks; and (9) various revenue risks (Czerwinski and Geddes, 2010). 
I first address the question of which risks are best borne by investors and which by the 
public sector. Investors may be better able to manage some risks (that is, to bear them at lower 
cost), while others may be more efficiently borne by government. Perhaps the major risk 
associated with toll facilities stems from uncertain future demand/revenue generated by 
transportation facilities. The financial failure of several major public-private partnerships (P3’s) 
(Legislative Study Committee, 2008) demonstrates the importance of employing an appropriate 
risk analysis and risk allocation strategy.  
Next, I examine various options for mitigating toll revenue risk. The overarching goal is 
to provide a set of recommendations regarding how revenue risk mitigation should be 
accomplished. Revenue-related risks have proven to be the most important risk associated with 
toll road provision in the United States. From the private sector’s standpoint, long-term 
obligations are very risky since future development patterns may not generate sustained revenues 
(i.e., traffic levels), and thus they profit even if toll rates are designed to be flexible and demand-
responsive (Checherita and Gifford, 2007). The main risk stems from how many toll road users 
are expected and thus what the future income will be. This question is even more intriguing in 
the states with highly volatile GDP, traffic flow, users’ willingness to pay tolls, or any other 
unstable variable that is crucial for the determination of future revenue. 
Toll highways in North America have encountered major revenue-related challenges, 
especially during the 2008-2009 economic downturn. Table 1 shows the major financial 
elements for several major toll roads/facilities. As can be seen in the table, most roads could not 
make net profits. Note that opposite to what was expected, the most profitable facility (New 
Jersey Turnpike) is owned/operated by a public agency. However, several strategies could be 
pursued to mitigate the revenue risk. After an overview of general risk management strategies, I 
examine a few revenue risk mitigation strategies.    
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Table 1 Net profits of various toll roads (2008) 
Source: http://www.barrons.com/articles/SB124183159872002803 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
RISK MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES  
In general, the major steps for managing risk include (Figure 1): (i) risk identification, (ii) risk 
quantification, (iii) risk allocation, (iv) risk mitigation, and (v) risk monitoring and control. Note 
that the risk mitigation step is not separated from the other steps, and other risk management 
strategies can even affect the choice among various risk mitigation options and vice versa. For 
instance, considering a flexible tolling schedule as an effective revenue risk mitigation strategy, 
the private (or public) operator/owner might be able to accept full traffic revenue risk (risk 
allocation step) since the operator can adjust toll rates to attract more demand during low 
revenue periods. However, without such flexible toll schedules, the private operator usually 
needs revenue guarantees or payments from the public agencies to make the project less risky 
(Rouhani et al., 2015b). This section provides a brief description of revenue risk analysis 
strategies as important factors in deciding about the risk mitigation option.   
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Figure 1. Various stages of risk management 
Source: 
http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/ceci/documents/UNDA_project/1._Introduction_to_PPP.ppt 
 
 
Based on another perspective, two basic risk management stages include: (1) identifying 
the risks by looking at similar projects and interviewing various stakeholders and end users, and 
(2) deciding whether to retain, manage, mitigate or control the risk (FHWA, 2012). In the case of 
toll roads, quantitative risk analyses are used to assess toll revenue risks. Inputs of the analysis 
are the information on (distributions of) a variety of individual risks/factors, including (i) 
population and economic growth (Bain, 2009), (ii) the pricing structure (Rouhani et al., 2013), 
(iii) the operating cost of toll collection (Rouhani, 2012), (iv) the costs and availability of 
alternative travel modes to the toll road (Rouhani and Niemeier, 2010), and (v) the price of fuel 
(Rouhani, 2010; Mirchi et al., 2012). 
Quantitative risk analysis can be categorized into two approaches: (1) formula-based 
analysis, and (2) Monte Carlo simulation. Formula-based quantitative risk analysis uses a simple 
formula to calculate average risk impact with respect to the probability of occurrence and reports 
the minimum, maximum, and most likely impact of the risk as outputs. Monte Carlo simulation, 
the other major approach, requires two inputs: (1) quantifying the probability and the revenue 
implications of the risk type under study, and (2) selecting a distribution type according to the 
nature of the risk. Based on these inputs, Monte Carlo simulation provides a simulation of the 
expected impact of the risk and determines a range of risk impacts along with their probabilities. 
The analysis will result in a probability distribution of the likely revenues under different 
confidence intervals. Note that the public and private sectors differ in their preferences. A risk-
averse public agency, for instance, may use 90 percent or 95 percent as its confidence level 
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preference while risk-taker private entities may be willing to use a confidence level close to 50 
percent (FHWA, 2012).   
 
REVENUE RISK FACTORS 
One important factor in designing different strategies for a toll road’s risk management is based 
on the outcomes of traffic revenue studies. Traffic revenue studies forecast traffic on toll 
facilities under various toll rate schedules (FHWA, 2012). These studies estimate the future 
behavior of people and businesses with respect to land use (housing location), travel mode 
choice, and route choice decisions. However, these estimates are associated with many 
uncertainties. In addition, revenue risk can vary significantly based on the scope of the project (a 
new construction project, expansion of existing facility, or conversion of an existing unpriced 
facility to a tolled one).  
The revenue risk consists of three major factors: (1) a demand risk or traffic volume risk, 
(2) a price risk related to toll rate settings, and (3) a risk associated with toll collection and/or 
operating costs. Demand risk, however, is linked to the price risk through the price elasticity of 
demand. Price elasticity of demand in turn is determined by the availability of travel substitutes 
for the toll road (Estache and Strong, 2000). One major factor that can significantly affect the 
availability of substitutes is a non-compete clause (Boarnet and DiMento, 2004; Ortiz et al., 
2008) included in some P3 toll road contracts, whether the public sector can provide an 
alternative nearby or not. Demand risk is also related to the quality and the level of congestion on 
the facility of concern. Performance-based requirements can significantly impact the demand 
(revenue) from toll roads as well as the related operating costs.  
Forecasting traffic demand is the major factor in analyzing revenue from P3 toll roads 
since travel demand influences both costs (through toll collection expenditures) and project 
revenues (through directly charging traffic), especially if tolls are the main revenue source for 
the P3 company (European Investment Bank, 2015). In addition, estimating the value of time can 
have important implications for toll revenues in the future (Rouhani, 2015).  
One very common issue (bias) in demand projections is the overestimation of traffic. In 
one prominent example, the Camino Columbia Toll Road (CCTR) in Laredo, Texas (Legislative 
Study Committee, 2008) was opened to traffic in October 2000. The initial traffic forecasts 
predicted 300 cars and 1,500 trucks per day. Although the number of cars was slightly under-
predicted, the estimated number of trucks never materialized, resulting in annual revenue of only 
$500 thousand rather than the estimated revenue of $9 million. As a result, the CCTR was sold at 
a foreclosure auction in 2004. Another example of the overestimation of traffic is the Dulles 
Greenway in Virginia. Despite the use of two independent consultants’ projections, the initial 
traffic was below 30 percent of the projected flow. Even after reducing tolls from $1.75 to $1, 
the traffic level was around 70 percent of the projection (Estache and Strong, 2000).  
The estimation of the future traffic level is biased for two reasons: (1) the so-called 
“optimism bias” (Lemp and Kockelman, 2009; Welde and Odeck, 2011): traffic forecasts are 
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prone to private sector prejudice (when they bid) because that they want to get the deal done, and 
(2) inflated traffic forecasts are also related to traffic modeling flaws (Bain, 2009). Figure 2 
depicts this systematic bias in the demand forecasts of toll roads.  
 
 
Figure 2. Distribution of actual-to-forecast traffic tolled (solid) and non-tolled (dashed). 
(Source: Bain and Plantagie 2004, Chart 3) 
 
For P3 projects, the revenue risk is particularly effective for greenfield P3s since 
expected traffic flows can only be inferred using statistical or travel demand modeling, while 
current traffic flows on brownfield P3s are known, and the future traffic flow estimations are 
more certain. 
Traffic forecasting is not the only major model affecting the analysis. Financial model 
and risk matrix can be very important in determining and controlling for revenue risk. Risks are 
identified and quantified in a risk matrix, considering a sensitivity analysis conducted along with 
the financial model and the value for money (VfM) analysis. Figure 3 shows how these tools are 
interrelated. 
 
Rouhani                                                                                                                                       7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3 Revenue/cost analysis during project phases. 
Source: https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/ipd/forum/challenges_and_opportunities/decisionmaking.aspx 
 
 
Another important element of revenue risk is the price risk. Price risk arises from 
political opposition to increasing the toll rate, and the inability to impose dynamic pricing and 
price differentiation across various vehicle types. The price risk has smaller effects than the 
demand risk; however, its potential cannot be underestimated. Providing an advanced technology 
along with a flexible pricing scheme can resolve most issues related to the price risk. Finally, the 
enforcement risks are associated with the type of toll collection system to be used (i.e., toll 
booths versus various automatic toll collection systems) since new toll collection systems can 
significantly decrease tolling costs and consequently improve the profitability of toll roads 
(Rouhani, 2014; Vats et al., 2014).   
A broad consensus among economists is that ideally the revenue risk should be borne by 
the private sector. The rationale is that private partners can influence key factors related to the 
risk such as the road quality, the congestion level, and the toll rate, which can in turn impact 
revenue (Engel et al., 1997). However, in many cases, the private sector is not willing to take on 
the risk because the risk seems to be immense. Therefore, public agencies should specifically 
search for various approaches to mitigate the revenue risk for private/public operators.    
Revenue Risk Mitigation Options 
Along with other risk management strategies, public agencies should explore options that could 
mitigate revenue risks for toll road P3 projects. Following are several factors that could mitigate 
such risks: 
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1) Pricing structure: 
One of the most critical policy issues facing potential private sponsors under P3 agreements and 
also for several public operators is related to the market power potentially held by the toll 
collection agency. The operator of a facility, whether public or private, possesses market power 
if there are few alternatives to a particular road, bridge, or tunnel—that is, when competition 
from other modes of travel and facilities is weak (Rouhani, 2009). If a bridge provides one of 
only a few ways to get to a certain destination, for example, then the toll collection firm can raise 
tolls above those that would be set in a competitive market (Rouhani and Gao, 2015). This leads 
to an inefficient equilibrium, where a small number of vehicles use the facility. The appropriate 
policy goal should be to create a set of institutional arrangements that achieves the best or 
optimal toll level/system (Rouhani et al., 2015c), and thus results in the correct number (from the 
social perspective) of vehicles using the facility (Geddes, 2011; Rouhani et al., 2014a), which 
might require very complex modeling and algorithms (Poorzahedy and Rouhani, 2007; Madani 
et al., 2011; Madani et al., 2014). 
To increase the possibility of higher profits and/or properly managing congestion 
(Rouhani et al., 2014b), public authorities should provide the private operator with a flexible 
(temporal and spatial) tolling scheme. The toll rates should be allowed to vary spatially 
(geographically) and temporally. Flexible tolls could be significantly effective in increasing 
profits, specifically in improving transportation system performance and congestion (Rouhani 
and Niemeier, 2014a). Tolls can vary based on time-of-day schedules (Chew, 2008) as is the case 
of Singapore, which is based on responsive tolls adjusted according to actual travel conditions 
(Bonsall et al., 2007), and from one road segment to another for a single toll road (Rouhani and 
Niemeier, 2014b). On the other hand, restrictions on toll levels (toll ceilings) can also 
significantly impact the revenue (Rouhani et al., 2015a). However, the structure provided (by the 
regulations) to collect tolls can be an extremely important leverage to reduce toll revenue risk. 
Nevertheless, this option is closely related to option 3, which will be discussed later in this 
section. 
2) Non-Compete Clauses: 
Non-compete clauses under P3 contracts have been a contentious issue in the United States, in 
part because of the controversy that arose about the California 91 Express Lanes non-compete 
clause (Boarnet and DiMento, 2004). A non-compete clause is a security offered by the public 
partner ensuring that it will not build a competing transportation facility within a specified 
distance of the privately operated toll facility. This clause may allow the public partner to 
construct a competing facility but must use a predetermined formula to compensate the private 
partner for lost revenues resulting from the unexpected competition (National Surface 
Transportation Infrastructure Financing Commission, 2009).  
For instance, the Indiana Toll Road concession agreement requires the state of Indiana to 
compensate the private concessionaire if the state constructs a new interstate-quality highway of 
twenty or more continuous miles, within ten miles of the Indiana Toll Road. On the other hand, 
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in some countries, “compensation clauses” are complementary, under which the private partner 
compensates the relevant public sponsor for increased revenue generated by an unplanned 
facility such as a new interchange or access road (Czerwinski and Geddes, 2010). However, non-
compete clauses play an important role in affecting both the amount of toll revenues and the risks 
associated with them. Clear statements should be included in P3 contracts, clarifying the 
potential of capacity enhancements and their revenue implications. The goal should be to find a 
balance between the project’s delivery objectives and the long-term sustainability of 
transportation systems (which may require adding capacity). The bankruptcies of many private 
partners have been directly or indirectly attributed to the associated non-compete clauses (Ortiz 
et al., 2008).  
3) Toll collections system: 
Another important issue that can mitigate revenue risk is related to toll collection costs. Victoria 
Transport Policy Institute (2014) estimated the toll costs in a range from 10 percent (for 
electronic tolls) to up to 40 percent (for toll booths) of toll revenue. Nevertheless, many toll 
roads have negative net profits (as shown in Table 1) because of other transaction-related costs. 
In another comprehensive study on North American toll roads, Balducci et al. (2011) calculated 
the operating and capital costs of collecting tolls. For major private toll roads like Toronto 407 
and Dulles Greenway, the operating cost is estimated at $0.2 per transaction (for private 
systems). The study estimated an operating cost of $0.24 per transaction for more costly 
publicly-run systems. The difference between the public and private toll collection costs and 
management (Geddes et al., 2015) exists despite the fact that some studies have shown that 
private provision does not systematically result in lower costs (Bel and Warner, 2008; Bel et al., 
2010). Nevertheless, scale or learning economies that cannot be reached by government could 
ensure lower unit costs of private services (De Bettignies and Ross, 2004).  
However, the choice among various toll collection systems has very important 
consequences on the costs, and as a result, on the profits of a toll road. To provide a less risky 
environment for toll collection agencies, regulations should aim for advanced technologies 
(Rouhani and Gao, 2014) to collect/manage tolls. Not only can advanced technologies increase 
revenue, they can provide better system performance (no queuing) and reduce social costs 
associated with toll booth operations; e.g., very high rates of suicide among toll booth employees 
(New Jersey On-Line LLC, 2012).    
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